The empirical relationship between market concentration and prices has been well established for a long time and for numerous industries. Recently it was confirmed for the US movie theater industry. This paper investigates, whether such a price-concentration relationship can be found on local cinema markets in Germany as well, focusing on up-to-date mainstream movies. First, we develop a model of monopolistic pricing and estimate its parameters using data of monopoly markets from a new set of German micro data. Then we apply the estimated model to simulate monopoly prices on local markets with two or more operators and compare them to the prices actually observed in these markets. We find no significant difference in admission prices, which puts our study in contrast to the results found on local US markets. Searching for an explanation, we test whether movie theater operators even though being located in the same geographic area, are local monopolists, but find no hint of that, either.
Introduction
It is a well-established insight of industrial organization research that a higher number of competing suppliers for a homogeneous good leads to lower prices on the market. At least since the seminal contribution of Weiss (1989) , price-concentration studies have been established in economic literature and applied in antitrust assessments of many merger cases. A huge empirical literature confirms the price-concentration relationship for a range of different industries. For instance, Brewer and Jackson (2006) , Cyrnak and Hannan (1999) , Hannan (1992) , Hannan and Liang (1993) , Kozak (2008) , Neumark and Sharpe (1992) , and Xie (2007) study the banking industry, and Borenstein (1989 Borenstein ( , 1990 , Brueckner et al. (1992) , Evans and Kessides (1993) , Kim and Singal (1993) , Morrison and Winston (1990) , and Singal (1996) study airlines. To avoid problems related to differentiated products, especially the degree of substitutability, most price-concentration studies focus on markets for "sufficiently homogeneous" goods (see, e. g., the examples in the recent comprehensive literature surveys by Newmark (2006) and Pautler 2003) . Cross-section analyses may be conducted using different industries, but more frequently geographically separated markets within the same industry are used. For instance, the aforementioned literature on airlines analyzes specific flight routes. This paper studies the German movie theater industry, focusing on mainstream movies. With a gross turnover of only Q757.9 million (Berauer 2008) , the movie theater industry is a rather small part of the German economy (5 0.1 % of GDP). Expenditures for movie theaters amount for some 1.6 % of all expenditures for leisure services and cultural services.
1 Nevertheless, almost every small city has at least one movie theater, and despite more or less continuously declining ticket sales over the last six decades, an average of 1.52 cinema visits per capita in 2007 (Berauer 2008 ) makes going to the movies still an important leisure activity. In the present paper, we focus on whether a price-concentration relationship can be found in the German movie theater industry. Comparable studies were done for other countries by Davis (2005) and Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) . Davis (2005) uses data of the US movie theater industry to directly estimate the price as a function of several market and competition variables. Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) develop a model that simultaneously explains market structure and prices, and test it using UK data. We extend the methodology by modeling optimal pricing behavior in the monopoly case. We calibrate this model using micro data from actual monopoly markets and use this calibrated model to predict monopoly prices in oligopoly markets.
2 If there actually is an effect of market concentration on prices, we will expect to find significantly lower prices on oligopoly markets than our calibrated monopoly model predicts. If, however, we do not find such a relationship, further investigation will be required to identify the reasons for the missing price effect. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the movie theater industry and sketches some preliminary considerations. Section 3 presents the monopoly model, while Section 4 provides details regarding the data set. In Section 5 we will discuss the results of the empirical analysis, finding no significant price effect of oligopoly markets. In order to find an explanation for this result, we test the hypothesis of movie theaters being local monopolists in Section 6. The results of our analyses are summarized in the conclusions.
Literature review and preliminary considerations
Studies on the movie theater industry usually use macro data and try to identify a cinema demand function. As economic intuition suggests, price and income are the most important determinants of demand. However, estimated price elasticities vary widely across different studies. In the short run, Cameron (1986) finds a price elasticity of À0.8, Sisto and Zanola (2007) estimate À0.37, and Dessy and Gambaro (2010) estimate À0.27. 1 Calculation based on Berauer (2008) and data on expenditures of private households from the Federal Statistical Office (http://www.destatis.de). 2 Media economics textbooks and literature often define local cinema markets with more than one operator as monopolistic competition (see e. g. Picard 1989 ). Other times it is referred to as oligopolistic competition (see e. g. Eliashberg 2005 ). Since our study considers mainstream movie theaters to be homogeneous, we tend to follow the latter one. As we do not model the pricing behavior in those markets, but search for significantly lower prices than on monopoly markets, the only crucial aspect for our study is that we can expect lower prices in both market forms as compared to the monopoly price.
Long run elasticities are generally higher (in absolute terms) and estimated to be À2. However, the number of available leisure activities will certainly be positively correlated with the size of the local market. Therefore, controlling for the number of inhabitants indirectly reflects the availability of substitutes.
The model
In the following section we will develop a simple model to describe the price-setting behavior of a monopolistic cinema operator. We assume that there are n spatially separated monopoly markets and the cinema operator on market k is facing a local cinema demand that can be described by
where I k is the local (per capita) income, 4 p k is the admission price, N k is the number of individuals in the local market, and a 1 to a 3 are parameters.
5 Since the major part of the costs for maintenance, heating, etc., is independent of the number of viewers, we impose fixed costs F, while variable costs, in line with Macmillan and Smith (2001) , are assumed to be zero. 6 The dominant licensing model in the movie theater industry is box-office revenue sharing. That is, for each ticket sold, the cinema operator has to pay a share t of the ticket price as license fee to the movie distributor (Kinowelt 2007: § 3) . 7 In some cases there might also be lump-sum fees (Kinowelt 2007: § 4) , which would be part of F. Each cinema operator is maximizing her profit P. Hence, the optimization problem of a monopolistic operator is
and the monopoly price p 1 can be described by
In the case that the optimal cinema demand D(p 1 ) exceeds the operator's cinema capacity K, which is assumed to be given and fixed, the operator will charge a higher price p 2 , so that the available capacity is just exhausted. Thus, for
and the optimal price p Ã of a monopolistic cinema operator can be finally described by the pricing rule
Since the optimal price as determined by (5) is independent of t, the price-setting behavior is not distorted by the variable part of the license fee. The pricing rule deduced here will later be used to estimate values for parameters a 1 to a 3 . 4 In addition to its usual influence on demand, income is also supposed to be a proxy for substitutes as well as to control for local differences in the cost of living. 5 For simplicity, the index k is omitted for the rest of the paper. 6 Including variable costs would shift the optimal solution to a combination of higher price and lower quantity. However, as there is no qualitative difference with respect to the operator's optimal pricing behavior, and due to the lack of available data and the resulting endogeneity problems, there is no gain from including variable costs into our model. 7 In Germany the revenue share usually ranges from approximately 38 % to 53 %, and is fix over time. This is a major difference to the US movie theater industry, where shares are declining over time starting with some 90 % of box office revenues being passed to the distributor for newly released movies (Filson et al. 2005 ). In addition, movie distributors in Germany might charge a limit price that can be considered to be non-binding, since limit prices of about 2 to 3 Euro are common. Unlike in the US, movie distributors do not influence the exhibitor's price setting behavior (see Kinowelt 2007) , which would be an illegal form of vertical integration.
The data
For the US movie theater market, Davis (2005 Davis ( , 2006a Davis ( , 2006b ) is able to exploit exhaustive time-series data on a disaggregated basis. Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) can use similar time-series data from the UK Competition Commission. Time-series data on the German movie theater industry is available only on a highly aggregated level (Berauer 2008 ) that is unsuitable for our purposes. Hence, cross-sectional data was collected from scratch in August 2008. In a first step, we identified areas that constitute geographically separated markets for cinema demand. An agglomeration is considered to be geographically separated, if the distance to the next agglomeration is sufficiently large to assume that consumers will not be willing to travel the distance to go to the movies. Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) consider the driving time to the next cinema as the appropriate measure. We convert their measure into distance with a rough calculation and find that their maximum radius is some 18 km. 8 Since actual driving time heavily depends on the means of transportation used, we prefer to follow Davis (2005) , who uses linear distance from the cinema. He states that in the US "few customers drive more than 20 miles to the cinema" (p. 26), which is roughly 32 km. The range of 20-32 km suits the usual geographic layout of a city with a lot of small towns around. We consider these areas to be agglomerations equipped with roads and public transportation. Traveling out of an agglomeration will require more time and cause more inconvenience than traveling within the agglomeration. For that reason, a local market is very unlikely to exceed the borders of the area.
9 Large integrated areas were not included in our data set, because there are several types of problems in the data collection, for instance regarding the appropriate number of inhabitants that will be used to describe market size. Take Berlin for instance: As a customer would need up to two hours to get from the north to the south of the city, it is rather unlikely that a cinema in the north and a cinema in the south compete on the same market. Hence, the data set should contain only the northern or the southern population to describe the market. This creates two problems: First, there is the question of where exactly the borders of the catchment area are. In densely populated areas like Berlin, a slight change in the definition of the catchment area can easily cause large changes in the "appropriate" number of inhabitants in the market. Second, often data is only available on the city level, so in a lot of cases, the appropriate data would be unavailable. The same holds for areas like Rhein-Main and the Ruhr, where cities are more or less seamlessly connected by densely populated commuter belts.
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Having identified 65 suitable areas, 11 we collected data on the number of inhabitants and per capita income. Since there was no central data source available at the required aggregation level, data on the former was taken from and matched with different sources, like the Federal Statistical Office and official city or community websites as of December 2007. For the same reason, data on the latter was taken from various sources, including State Statistical Offices and official city and community websites. The data consists of the values for the year 2005.
12 Using data from the Federal Statistical Office (http://www.destatis.de), we compute the share of 15-49 year old people in the administrative district of each cinema, which might be considered as the target group for going to the movies.
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For each city the number of cinemas was identified by performing a search for "[city name], kino" on Google Maps. The result was matched with information from http://www. meinestadt.de, an Internet portal that offers comprehensive information about almost every city and region in Germany. Our study focuses on mainstream movie theaters, so art houses, drive-ins, and other cinemas have been ignored because of their lack of homogeneity with mainstream cinema. Furthermore, only cinemas featuring a certain up-to-date portfolio of movies have been selected for the sample. That way, we ensure that the locations are sufficiently homogeneous, and competition does not take place via product differentiation. Data on admission prices, capacities, and owners was collected using the cinemas' websites. Similarly to Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) , admission prices for a common 14 Saturday 8 p. m. show were identified. In case of differentiated prices depending on the type of seat (e. g. front row, back row, loge), the medium price category was chosen. Capacity is measured by the number of seats the cinema provides, which according to Dewenter and Westermann (2005) is a more appropriate measure than the number of screens. For multiplexes (which almost all the cinemas were), the sum of seats for all screens was taken.
The total sample consists of 109 cinema locations from 65 distinct areas. An average cinema charges an admission price of Q7.10 and has a capacity of 1,448 seats. An average area has 173,276 inhabitants of which on average 48.2 % are 15 to 49 years old. The average annual income is Q16,507 per capita ( Table 1 ). Note that the values of price and capacity as given in Table 1 are calculated on the level of the individual cinema location, while values of inhabitants and income are on an area basis, which leads to the different numbers of observations in the last column.
11 Most areas are monocentric around a city. 12 More recent data was available only for a few areas. To keep the data set consistent, the 2005 values were used. 13 In 2007 about 90 % of all moviegoers were aged 14-49 (Berauer 2008 ). 14 German movie theaters usually charge extra for extra-long performances. "Common" means that the movie is not extra-long. The analysis in the following section requires the data to be aggregated on the area level. Furthermore, the sample needs to be split into monopoly and oligopoly areas. To do so, we use the (directly observable) information on cinema operators. An area with only one cinema operator, even if she runs several locations within this area, is considered to be a monopoly. Note that this proceeding might be criticized, because market structure and market profitability might be correlated. This would imply that monopoly markets do not reflect monopoly power, but a less profitable market. This argument requires markets to be in a long run, free-entry competitive equilibrium. However, technology changes and exogenous demand shocks interfere with this long-term convergence (Evans et al. 1993: 432, FN 2) . Total demand in the German movie theater industry is highly volatile. Using 149.0 million attendances in 1999 as reference point, demand first increased to 177.9 million attendances in 2001, just to drop back to 149.0 million in 2003, and 125.4 million in 2007 (Berauer 2008) . Since new developments in home entertainment technology have emerged frequently, and in the short run, market entry is not free, because of high sunk costs, it is unlikely that the German movie theater industry is in a long run equilibrium. Therefore we do not expect monopolistic market structures to reflect less profitable markets, but monopoly power. Table 2 presents some descriptive information on the monopoly subsample, which consists of 41 observations. In the case of one owner with multiple locations in one area, capacities are summed over all locations.
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In the case of more than one cinema operator, the area is considered to be an oligopoly. To obtain per area data, the number of seats is summed over all cinemas in an area. Admission prices are calculated as the capacity-weighted average of all locations in the area. Table 3 shows the descriptive data of this subsample, which consists of 24 observations.
As can be seen by comparing Tables 2 and 3 , oligopoly markets are on average more than two and a half times as large as monopoly markets, while the average (aggregated) capacity on oligopoly markets is almost three times larger than on monopoly markets. Hence, the relative capacity (number of seats per inhabitant) is rather similar in the two cases (0.0140 for monopolies and 0.0148 for oligopolies). In a last step, data on competition was gathered. We included cinemas up to 20 km linear distance from the cinema considered, which is between the limits used in Beckert and Mazzarotto (2010) and in Davis (2005) .
Empirical results
In Section 3, we developed a simple monopoly model and deduced a pricing rule for a monopolistic cinema operator (equation (5)). We will now use the monopoly data described in Table 2 to estimate the parameters a 1 to a 3 of equation (5). 16 As (5) is a branched function, standard OLS technique cannot be applied. Instead we do a nonlinear least squares regression (NLS) and obtain the results presented in Table 4 . Departing from a given set of starting values, NLS adjusts the parameters iteratively aiming at minimizing the sum of the squared residuals. We use an implementation of the Gauss-Newton algorithm to estimate the parameters. 17 This algorithm linearizes the optimization problem, i. e. the minimization of the residual sum of squares, using Taylor approximation around the starting values and then solves this system of linear equations to obtain new parameters. These new parameters serve as starting values for the next iteration as long as the value of the objective function becomes smaller. Note that latest econometric research emphasizes the pitfall of such deterministic algorithms, namely the risk of being stuck in a local optimum, because the objective function might be complex and not well behaved (see e. g. Gilli/Winker 2009 and Winker/Maringer 2009). To test whether this is the case here, we follow the simple heuristic suggested by Winker and Maringer (2009) , and restart the algorithm with a broad set of starting values. It turns out that the algorithm converges to two different parameter sets for all starting values used. One of these sets yields economically implausible values (negative demand), so we use the other one, which is presented in Table 4 . 17 We use the Gauss-Newton algorithm as implemented in the "nls" package of the statistics software R. Our results are robust with respect to the different algorithms. For a discussion of the GaussNewton algorithm see e. g. Seber and Wild (1989) , Chapter 14. 18 The results of a Jackknife resampling test suggested to exclude one observation from the NLS estimation. The values presented here are estimated without this specific observation. Furthermore, graphical inspection shows that the residuals are homoskedastic. Since the largest correlation coefficient of our data set is 0.35, we do not expect that our estimations are affected by multicollinearity.
As expected, the admission price has a significantly negative influence on demand.
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Using the parameter estimates and equation (1) to compute demand, we find that there are only two cases, in which the capacity constraint is binding (D(p) 4 _ K). Thus, we can conclude that the capacity of a cinema is usually not a binding restriction, which is in line with aggregated statistics.
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Interestingly, the number of individuals in the local market, N, which we obtained from multiplying the number of inhabitants with the share of individuals aged 15 to 49, does not have a significant influence on the price. This can be explained by the fact that a higher market size is usually connected with higher capacities, so that the ratio of inhabitants to capacity is almost constant for all markets. 21 Since N was also supposed to be a proxy for local substitutes, we might also conclude that there is no significant influence of cinema substitutes. This result confirms the findings of Bonato et al. (1990) as discussed in Section 2. By inserting the estimated values for a 1 to a 3 as presented in Table 4 into the pricing rule (5), we obtain the calibrated pricing rule, referred to as (c5) in the following. In order to identify competitive effects, we use (c5) to compute hypothetical monopoly prices for the oligopoly areas described in Table 3 . Then we pool the data sets of monopoly and oligopoly areas. A potential competitive price effect on oligopoly markets would now be revealed if observed prices and hypothetical monopoly prices significantly differed on these markets. To test this, we use a regression model of the form
where p obs denotes the observed price, while D DUO to D QUAD are dummy variables for markets with two, three, and four cinema operators, respectively. 22 If the observation is an oligopoly, p hyp denotes the hypothetical monopoly price. If it is a monopoly, p hyp denotes the estimated price, implicitly obtained in the NLS estimation described above. Table 5 shows the regression results.
As expected, the parameter of the hypothetical monopoly price, b 1, is highly significant at the 0.1 % level and its value is almost equal to one. The influence of the dummy variables 19 Remember that in (1) p enters negatively, so that a positive coefficient means a negative impact of p. 20 The average load in 2005 was just 12.3 %, with only slight differences between multiplexes (12.6 -12.8 %) and smaller sites (11.1 -11.9 %) (Schultz/Beigel 2006 
Furthermore, instead of dummies, the number of cinema operators was used. Both alternative specifications yield the same qualitative result as the one presented in Table 5 . b 2 , b 3 , and b 4 , however, is insignificant in all cases. We do not find any significant influence of the number of cinema operators on the price in local cinema markets. There are several explanations for this, one of which is that competition among cinema operators is weak or even impossible due to transportation costs. In this case, each cinema operator would act as a local monopolist. In order to rule out this explanation, we will analyze the effects of distance in the next section of this paper.
6 The effects of distance and additional capacity Davis (2005) measures the effect of market concentration on admission prices for US cinemas. He finds that alternative or additional supply in the same geographic area influences ticket prices negatively. The negative effect decreases (in absolute terms) with increasing distance from the cinema. He uses the number of screens to measure supply and differentiates between screens owned by the same company and screens owned by other (rival) companies. To take account of the distance between cinema locations, he uses 15 categories, starting with the number of screens at distances 0 -0.5 miles, 0.5 -1 mile, and so on, incrementing in 1-mile steps until 10 miles and then incrementing in 5-mile steps until he reaches a maximum linear distance of 30 miles from the location. We will use a similar approach and estimate the dependence of the price on market size and supply. Based on each cinema location i, the additional supply was determined by measuring the number of seats, CAP, available at other locations within the same area j. 23 Own and rival seats were distinguished and categorized by their distance. Since using 15 categories -as in Davis (2005) -would have resulted in lack of data variation (as most values would have been zero), we used only three categories: 0 -1 km (very close), 1 -5 km (close), and 5 -20 km (distant) linear distance from the cinema. To control for market-specific effects, the model specification includes the number of inhabitants, INHAB, in the area as a measure for market size, and the annual per capita income, INC, as a measure for consumer income, as suggested by Newmark (2006) . Although one might expect a positive influence of a cinema's market power on its charged price, measures of market concentration have been omitted from the specification to avoid endogeneity problems , Newmark 2006 . Controlling for quality is appealing, too: Cinema size might have been used as a quality indicator as well as the range of available films or the number of screens (Cameron 1990) . While multiplex cinemas perhaps offer a large variety of different movies, smaller cinemas might be more homelike. Customers might perceive either the one or the other as superior quality. Hence, the expected effect is ambiguous, and the sign of the coefficient would have been interesting to observe. Different quality, however, is a variable controlled by the single firm; thus it is endogenous as well (Newmark 2006) and is omitted from our specification. Furthermore, the effect of quality differences should be minimal in our case, since the sample was selected with the homogeneity of the good in mind. Last but not least, cost differences might be an explanation for price differences. This is closely related to the quality issues mentioned above. For instance, a downtown cinema might have to pay a higher rent than a greenfield cinema. However, costs resulting from strategic decisions like location and quality choice must be seen as endogenous and have to be omitted from the specification (Newmark 2006) .
We use OLS to estimate the model
where i,j represent the i-th cinema that operates in the j-th area. We expect the coefficient of INHAB to be positive, because -ceteris paribus -an increase in the number of inhabitants implies an increase in market size, which implies an increase in demand. The expected effect of INC is ambiguous, because an increase in income might either increase demand or enable consumers to pursue more expensive leisure activities, which would decrease cinema demand. CAP i in general is the capacity of all other cinema locations within the same area. We refine CAP i by disentangling it regarding distance and/or ownership (specifications 1 -3). In general, all CAP coefficients should be negative, because increased supply ceteris paribus causes lower prices. If transportation costs were important, we would expect -in absolute terms -smaller coefficients for distant (close) capacity than for close (very close) capacity. To form an expectation for the effect of ownership, we need to take a closer look at the data. Having no rival capacity means that the observation is a monopoly market. If there is rival capacity, the observation will be an oligopoly market. However, some monopoly owners have several locations within the same area. Hence, we would expect own capacity to represent the ceteris paribus price-lowering effect of increased supply. Rival capacity should also incorporate this effect. In addition, the rival capacity coefficient should also contain the price-lowering effect of competition in oligopoly markets. Hence, we expect the coefficient of rival capacity to be more negative than the coefficient of own capacity. Table 6 shows estimation and test results. Ramsey's RESET test shows that we do not have to reject our model specifications as incorrect. The adjusted R 2 signals that we explain only a little of the observed variance. This might be because of the omitted variables or because of other (unknown) marketspecific factors driving the demand for cinema. Nevertheless, our results are in line with the empirical literature on movie theaters, where R 2 values below 0.2 are common. Although he has a much larger data set, Davis (2005) also gets R 2 below 0.1 for all regressions, except for pooled OLS where it is 0.18. Ferná ndez Blanco and Bañ os Pino (1997), who do not estimate prices, but cinema demand, obtain an R 2 of 0.13.
As expected, under all specifications the coefficient of INHAB is significantly positive, the coefficient of INC is positive, but insignificant, and the coefficients of CAP are negative. As the marginal effect of one additional seat is small, we will get more demonstrative values by multiplying the coefficients of Table 6 by 1000. Imagine the values given in the following as the price effect of a cinema with 1000-seat capacity in the category considered. Under specification 1, CAP is distinguished by the owner as well as by the distance from the cinema, which results in six different CAP variables. All variables have the expected sign, but only the coefficients for close (for distant) rival capacity are significant at the 1 % (the 0.1 %) level. Note that the two coefficients are almost equal (Q À0.21), and note further that the weakly significant coefficients of very close and close own capacities are of the same magnitude as well. Specification 2 distinguishes distance categories only. If transportation costs played a role, we would expect the coefficients to decrease (in absolute terms) with distance. Our estimation results (Q À0.18, Q À0.22, and Q À0.21) indicate, however, that distance has no effect on the price. This contradicts the results of Davis (2005) , who finds the negative effect to be decreasing (in absolute terms) with increasing distance. It seems that transportation costs are so small that they do not matter or customers ignore them. In this case, the local-monopolist hypothesis does not hold.
Specification 3 pools all distance categories, thus distinguishes only own and rival seats. The regression yields significant coefficients of similar value for both own (Q À0.19) and rival (Q À0.21) capacity. This is contrary to our expectations, but in line with the results of Davis (2005) . The coefficients of specification 3 are almost equal, so that it does not seem to make a difference for prices who owns the additional capacity. As mentioned above, rival capacity only exists on oligopoly markets, while some monopolists operate 24 The Breusch-Pagan test showed that homoskedasticity of the error terms must be rejected for specifications 2 and 3. Hence, the standard deviation has been computed using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. more than one cinema in an area. Hence, the coefficient of own capacity should be smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient of rival capacity, as the latter should reduce the monopoly price markup.
Conclusions
In Section 5, we tried to find a price-concentration relationship by applying the monopoly model on our data set. We did not find a significant effect of the number of operators on the observed admission price. One possible explanation for such a result might have been the existence of local monopolies, caused by transportation costs. In this case, we would expect to find significantly lower prices for rival cinemas in close neighborhood, with the price effect decreasing (in absolute terms) for more distant rival locations. However, in section 6 we do not find any hint on such an effect. Within an area, transportation costs do not seem to play a significant role for market power. Nevertheless, transportation costs might of course influence the total demand on the market.
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One important shortcoming of our study is that cinema revenue does not consist of boxoffice revenues only. One other source of revenues is advertisement in movie theaters. In 2007, a total of Q106.2 million was spent for such commercial activities in Germany (Berauer 2008) . From this perspective, a cinema operates on a two-sided market. On the one hand it sells tickets; on the other hand it sells advertising space. The value of its advertising space depends on the number of customers that visit the location, that is, the number of tickets sold. By reducing the ticket price below the single-sided market optimum, more tickets will be sold and more revenues from advertising will be generated. To develop and test a model of the cinema market as a two-sided market is the task of future research.
Our simple theoretical model ignores revenues from selling complementary goods like popcorn, drinks, and ice cream due to the lack of available data. The interesting point in this case is that selling these goods causes variable costs, but unlike admission prices, the receipts do not have to be shared with the distributor. Hence, cinema operators might charge lower admission prices to attract more customers, increasing receipts in, e. g., popcorn sales, or in other words, shifting turnover away from the shared box-office receipts to the nonshared complementary goods. In addition, price competition might take place with these goods as well. A recent theoretical contribution by Chen (2009) investigates this issue.
Finally, price discrimination is common in movie theaters. Prices differ by day of the week, time of day, age, and employment status (e. g. through student rebates). Furthermore, second-degree price discrimination (five for the price of four, or even flat rates) is very common.
Empirical testing of a comprehensive model including advertising and complementary goods revenues and allowing for price discrimination might be the goal of future research.
